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Spatial demonstratives – terms including this and that – are among
the most common words across all languages. Yet, there are con-
siderable differences between languages in how demonstratives
carve up space and the object characteristics they can refer to,
challenging the idea that the mapping between spatial demonstra-
tives and the vision and action systems is universal. In seven exper-
iments we show direct parallels between spatial demonstrative
usage in English and (non-linguistic) memory for object location,
indicating close connections between the language of space and
non-linguistic spatial representation. Spatial demonstrative choice
in English and immediate memory for object location are affected
by a range of parameters – distance, ownership, visibility and
familiarity – that are lexicalized in the demonstrative systems of
some other languages. The results support a common set of con-
straints on language used to talk about space and on (non-linguis-
tic) spatial representation itself. Differences in demonstrative
systems across languages may emerge from basic distinctions in
the representation and memory for object location. In turn, these
distinctions offer a building block from which non-spatial uses of
demonstratives can develop.
 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc.
Y license.Research
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The mapping between language and space has garnered much interest in the cognitive sciences.
Space is regarded by many as a fundamental building block of language and cognition, and as a struc-
turing tool for domains such as time and emotion (see for example Casasanto & Boroditsky, 2008; Lak-
off, 1987; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). Given its importance, one might expect to ﬁnd considerable
regularity across languages in how space is represented in language. Yet it has long been recognized
that languages vary quite considerably in how they carve up space. For example, some languages have
more words to describe containment and support relations than in English (e.g. Dutch), while others
have less (e.g. Spanish, Indonesian; see Bowerman, 1996; Feist, 2008 for discussion). Some languages
use cardinal directions to specify relations in table top space (e.g. Tzeltal), while others, English among
them, prefer to use the viewpoint of the speaker or the relative positions of objects (Levinson, 2003).
These (and other) differences are intriguing, and lead directly to two key questions regarding the map-
ping between language and space. First, do these language differences jeopardize a systematic map-
ping between language and the vision and action systems across speakers of languages (for
different views on this, see for example Crawford, Regier, & Huttenlocher, 2000; Munnich, Landau,
& Dosher, 2001)? Second, do speakers of different languages process the spatial world in different
ways as a result of the language they speak (see for example Deutscher, 2010; Li, Abarbanell, Gleitman,
& Papafragou, 2011)?
The main goal we have in this paper is to consider the mapping between language and space for
arguably the most important spatial terms in all languages – spatial demonstratives (e.g. this and that).
These terms occur in all languages, are high frequency terms within a language, and philologically
emerge as the earliest traceable words in languages (Deutscher, 2005; Diessel, 1999, 2006). They
are among the ﬁrst words all children acquire (Clark, 1978, 2003) and are more closely associated with
deictic gestures than many other linguistic items (Clark, 1996; Diessel, 2006). Yet they have been ne-
glected from an empirical point of view. The main aim of this paper is to understand the conditions
under which these essential terms are used, and how their use maps onto non-linguistic spatial rep-
resentation and memory for object location. To do so, we present seven experiments demonstrating
systematic overlaps between demonstrative choice and (non-linguistic) memory for object location.
The second goal we have is to consider the status of language differences across spatial demonstra-
tive systems. The (often tacit) assumption in cross-linguistic research is that the lexicalized or overt
distinctions a language makes are predictive of the distinctions speakers of that language employ
when using that language. This assumption has led directly to a research industry looking at the con-
sequences of these language differences for the mapping between language and non-linguistic sys-
tems on the one hand, and claims and tests of various forms of ‘linguistic relativity’ on the other
(see Wolff & Holmes, 2010 for a recent overview). Our conclusion will be that more careful consider-
ation regarding the nature of such language differences – in tandem with empirical investigation of
spatial language choice and non-linguistic spatial representation together – reveals more commonal-
ity across speakers and languages than lexical distinctions might suggest.
The third goal is to consider constraints on the perceptual and mnemonic representations of space
itself. The mapping between language and space is usually considered from the perspective of taking
what is known about the vision and action systems and mapping that onto language. Here we also
consider the reverse mapping: can distinctions in language provide clues to the nature of the mne-
monic representation of space? We will conclude that distinctions in language can lead to a richer
understanding of the nature of (non-linguistic) perception of space generally, and memory for object
location speciﬁcally.1.1. Spatial demonstratives across languages and perceptual space
Demonstratives occur across a range of linguistic contexts. A distinction is often made between
exophoric use of demonstratives – where objects in the surrounding situation are referred to (Diessel,
1999; Halliday & Hassan, 1976) – and endophoric use, which includes demonstratives used in dis-
course reference, anaphoric reference and temporal reference. It is generally accepted that exophoric
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extensive discussion). In exophoric usage a demonstrative is taken to pick out the object being re-
ferred to in a spatial context (Enﬁeld, 2003; Fillmore, 1982).
In a large-scale analysis of demonstrative systems across over 234 languages, Diessel (2005) found
that the most basic distinction languages make is a binary distinction (54% of languages sampled; Eng-
lish among them). From this Diessel suggests that a proximal–distal contrast underlies demonstrative
systems across languages (Diessel, 2005, 2006). However, as Enﬁeld (2003) has noted, typologies are
not based on actual studies of demonstrative use; the evidence that two-term demonstrative systems
are proximal–distal is an assumption based on intuition alone. Only recently have a small number of
experimental studies begun to examine the mapping between demonstratives and perceptual space.
Coventry, Valdés, Castillo, and Guijarro-Fuentes (2008) tested the mapping between perceptual
space and demonstrative use using a methodology designed to elicit spatial demonstratives without
speakers realizing that their language was being tested. English and Spanish-speaking participants
were instructed to produce either this or that (or the Spanish equivalents: este, ese, aquel) to identify
the position of colored geometrical shapes/disks on a table (whilst believing the experiment was about
memory for object location). When the object was placed within arm’s reach participants tended to
use this (este in Spanish) more often than that (in tandem with pointing). They also used this/estemore
frequently when they had placed the object rather than when the experimenter had placed the object.
Moreover an extension of the use of this/este to describe positions beyond arm’s reach was found when
participants pointed using a stick.
These and other ﬁndings (Bonﬁglioli, Finocchiaro, Gesierich, Rositani, & Vescovi, 2009; Coello &
Bonnotte, 2013; Maes & De Rooij, 2007; Stevens & Zhang, 2013) are consistent with work in neurosci-
ence and neuropsychology that has identiﬁed two separate brain systems representing peripersonal
(near) and extrapersonal (far) space (see for example Berti & Rizzolatti, 2002; Legrand, Brozzoli, Ros-
setti, & Farné, 2007; Làdavas, 2002). In particular the latter two ﬁndings in Coventry et al. mirror the
results of studies on peripersonal space showing that contact with objects is important for the exten-
sion of peripersonal space, and that peripersonal space can be extended through tool use (e.g. Berti &
Frassinetti, 2000; Longo & Lourenco, 2006).
While these studies suggest that spatial demonstratives do map onto perceptual space, demonstra-
tive systems vary quite considerably across languages. Some languages have three-term demonstra-
tive systems, which are usually regarded as distance oriented (Spanish: Kemmerer, 1999; Levinson,
2003), or person oriented (e.g., Japanese: Diessel, 2005). There are also other distinctions languages
make, such as whether an object is visible or not (e.g. Tiriyó: Meira, 2003; Quileute: Diessel, 1999),
whether or not an object is owned by the speaker (e.g. Supyire: Diessel, 1999), and whether the object
is elevated on the vertical plan (e.g. Dyirbal, Lahu: Diessel, 1999).
Given these more ‘unusual’ distinctions in demonstrative systems one might think that the rela-
tionship between demonstrative systems and perceptual space – and the peripersonal versus extra-
personal distinction in particular – is in jeopardy (see for example Enﬁeld, 2003; Kemmerer, 2006
for discussion). However, recent advances in understanding the nature of the periperpersonal–extra-
personal space distinction and ﬁndings on distance perception more broadly reveal much more rich-
ness to egocentric distance perception than an absolute near–far binary distinction suggests.
To begin with, it has been shown that near space is ﬂexible. Not only can it be extended with tool
use (Berti & Frassinetti, 2000; Holmes, Calvert, & Spence, 2004; Iriki, Tanaka, & Iwamura, 1996; Longo
& Lourenco, 2006), but it can also be contracted (e.g. with the use of wrist weights; Lourenco & Longo,
2009), and the boundary from peripersonal to extrapersonal space is graded rather than absolute (Lon-
go & Lourenco, 2006). Moreover, ‘semantic’ information about objects inﬂuences perception and mem-
ory for distance across a range of measures and paradigms, including memory for object location,
verbal distance estimates to objects, throwing a beanbag towards an object, and visuomotor actions
performed on objects. For instance desirable objects are perceived as closer than less desirable objects
(Balcetis & Dunning, 2010; Valdés-Conroy, Román, Hinojosa, & Shorkey, 2012; but see Durgin, De-
Wald, Lechich, Li, & Ontiveros, 2011; Francis, 2012), owned object locations are remembered better
(Cunningham, Turk, Macdonald, & Macrae, 2008) and are placed closer during interactions than
non-owned objects (Constable, Kritikos, & Bayliss, 2011). And consistent with the ﬁndings of Longo
and Lourenco (2006) on the contraction of peripersonal space, it has been shown that increased effort
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Spiegel, Strawser, & Williams, 2012).
These studies are among a battery of recent ﬁndings showing that the perception of space is not
constrained solely by the characteristics of the physical environment, but is mediated by high-level
knowledge about the objects being perceived. These advances in understanding perceptual space,
we think, make some of the more ‘exotic’ demonstrative system contrasts across languages appear less
arbitrary and much closer to grounding in non-linguistic spatial perception and memory. Moreover, if
a common set of perceptual properties underlie demonstrative use, one might ﬁnd that the distinc-
tions lexicalised in some demonstrative systems are used by speakers of languages with demonstra-
tives systems that do not make those lexical distinctions. By the same token, one should ﬁnd direct
parallels in performance comparing linguistic and non-linguistic tasks.2. Overview of experiments and methods
In seven experiments we test a range of object knowledge parameters on demonstrative use in
English, and on a non-linguistic version of the same tasks (immediate memory for object location).
Experiments 1 (language) and 2 (memory) consider an object knowledge property which is both
explicitly lexicalised in some demonstrative systems (e.g. Supyire) and has been recently shown to af-
fect (non-linguistic) perception of object location – ownership. Experiments 3 and 4 take a second ob-
ject knowledge property with is commonly lexicalized in Native American languages (e.g. Quileute,
West Greenlandic: Diessel, 1999) and in other languages (e.g. Sinhala: Chandralal, 2010) – visibility
– and tests whether this similarly affects demonstrative use in English (Experiment 3) and memory
for object location (Experiment 4). Following on from the results of Experiments 1–4, Experiments
5 and 6 test a third object knowledge property we thought might also be a predictor of demonstrative
choice and memory for object location – familiarity. Experiment 7 compares language and memory
performance within participants to explore the direct mapping between them.
The language experiments (Experiments 1, 3, 5, 7) employed the method developed in Coventry
et al. (2008) to elicit demonstrative use within a strictly controlled experimental paradigm (see
Fig. 1). Participants played a ‘memory game’ where the goal of the game was to remember the posi-
tions of objects placed on colored dots along the midline of a large conference table. They were further
informed that they were taking part in an experiment examining the effects of language on memory
for object location and that they were in the ‘language condition.’ After each object placement, partic-
ipants had to point to each object naming it using a combination of just three words: a demonstrative,
an object property, and an object name (e.g., this/that red circle; this/that pound coin), so that everyone
in the ‘language condition’ experienced the same level of language coding. This afforded collection of
language data without participants realising that we were interested in their choice of demonstratives.
The memory experiments (Experiments 2, 4, 6, 7) utilized the same physical set up as the language
experiments, but with some differences (see Fig. 2). The experiments were presented as memory for
object location experiments (with no mention of language). For these experiments participants had to
instruct the experimenter to move a stick (using the commands ‘closer’, ‘further’) to the location
where an object had just been placed. This allowed a comparison of the estimated distance to the ac-
tual distance from the participant the object had been placed.3. Experiment 1 – Ownership and demonstrative choice
The main goal of this Experiment was to examine the possible effect of ownership on demonstra-
tive choice (this versus that) in English. Ownership provides an explicit structuring tool for some
demonstratives systems (e.g. Supyire: Diessel, 1999), and may also be manifest in person-centred
demonstrative contrasts common in languages that have more than two demonstratives (e.g. Japa-
nese: Diessel, 1999; near the speaker, near the hearer, far from either). More generally, the concept
of ownership appears to be universal across cultures (Brown, 1991), and ownership gives an object
an enhanced status (Beggan, 1992).
Fig. 1. Examples of object placements in the memory game. (a) –(c) Show the visibility conditions in Experiment 3 (where the
participant placed the objects). (d) Shows a participant describing in the no visibility condition.
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strative choice; the (egocentric) distance of the object from the participant (with more frequent use of
this in peripersonal space than in extrapersonal space) and who places the object (Coventry et al.,
2008). The latter variable – who places an object – was of particular interest given the possible role
of ownership as an explanation of its inﬂuence. Coventry et al. (2008) found that when the participant
placed an object the use of this was more probable than when the experimenter placed the same ob-
ject, and they interpret the effect in terms of peripersonal space: when a participant places an object it
has been in his/her peripersonal space, hence the increased use of this following participant place-
ments. However, an alternative – and equally plausible – explanation is that contacting an object in-
stills a sense of object ownership, which may in turn inculcate a mapping between this-mine and that-
yours. In the previous experiments ownership was not explicitly marked, and under such circum-
stances contacting an object may provide a marker of ownership (consistent with ﬁrst possessor ac-
counts of ownership – see for example Friedman & Neary, 2008). If this ownership account of ‘who
places’ is correct, one would expect to ﬁnd that making ownership clear would eliminate the ‘who
Fig. 2. Example of the setup in the memory experiments (Experiments 2, 4, 6, 7). (a) Shows the visible cover condition in
Experiment 4. (b) Shows the stick position: the stick moved either towards or away from the participant according to the
participant’s instructions (‘closer’, ‘further’) until it was aligned with where the participant thought the object had been located
(when they said ‘stop’).
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should ﬁnd an effect of who places even in the face of explicit ownership demarcation. (Note that this
latter interpretation is consistent with a recent philosophical account of demonstratives involving
‘control’ proposed by Brovold and Grush (2012)).
The experiment employed a 2 (ownership)  2 (who places)  9 (object distance) design.
3.1. Method
3.1.1. Participants
Twenty-ﬁve participants (4 male) were recruited from the student and local community popula-
tions. Their average age was 22 years (range 18–28 years), and all were monolingual native speakers
of English. Participants took part for (nominal) payment.
3.1.2. Procedure
Participants were seated at a large conference table (75 cm wide and 320 cm long) on which 9 col-
ored dots (each a different color) were placed at 25 cm intervals down the midline directly in front of
participants, starting at 25 cm from the end of the table where they were seated. They played a ‘mem-
ory game’ where the goal of the game was to remember the positions of coins (see Fig. 1) placed on the
dots.
At the start of the experiment participants were informed that they were taking part in an exper-
iment examining the effects of language on memory for object location and that they were in the ‘lan-
guage condition.’ They were ﬁrst told that cards would be read out with a placement instruction (e.g.,
‘‘You place your/my OBJECT NAME on red dot’’ or ‘‘I place your/my OBJECT NAME on red dot’’ – always
read by the experimenter). Although some of the locations were well within the participants’ and
experimenters’ reach, they were instructed that on every trial on which they were asked to place, they
should stand up and walk to the side of the table to place the object. Following placement, participants
were instructed to return to their seat and to point to each object naming it using a combination of just
three words: a demonstrative, an object property, and an object name (e.g., this/that red circle; this/that
pound coin), so that everyone in the ‘language condition’ experienced the same level of language cod-
ing. After verbal description, the object was retrieved by the person who placed it, and the next card
was read out. Participants were told that they would be asked questions at the end of the game about
where objects had been placed.
In this Experiment the participant and experimenter placed coins onto the colored dots. The
manipulations were the distance the object was placed from the participant (9 distances), who placed
the object to be described (2 placers), and the new manipulation of object ownership (owned by par-
ticipants, owned by experimenter). In order to instill a sense of ownership over the placed objects,
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a £1 coin and two 50p pieces. They were paid at the beginning of the experiment and told that the
coins would be used as stimuli. The experimenter had her own set of coins. The coins were placed
in front of the participant and the experimenter, respectively. In half of the trials the participant placed
the coins and in the other half the experimenter placed the coins. Half the time the participant and the
experimenter placed their own coins and in the other half they placed the other person’s coins. The
participant identiﬁed the denomination of the coin (e.g. this ﬁfty pence coin, that one pound coin) in
every trial (including those where the experimenter placed).
There were 36 trials (fully randomized); the participant (and experimenter) placed their own and
the experimenter’s coins once on each of the nine locations.
At the end of the experiment (and at the end of the other experiments also), reaching distances
were measured to ensure that the physical boundary between peripersonal space and extrapersonal
was as expected (between locations 3 and 4 dots away from participants). This was conﬁrmed. More-
over, in this experiment (and all the other experiments reported below) all participants used either
this or that on all trials as the ﬁrst term in their utterances as instructed, and on debrief no participants
reported the use of the expressions feeling unnatural to them or inappropriate. This was important to
note given some previous ﬁndings (Bangerter, 2004) that participants point less frequently at far dis-
tances when using verbal deixis than for near distances (at least in a task that involves picking out
objects from among a large array of objects).
3.2. Results and discussion
Following Coventry et al. (2008), we calculated the percentage use of this for each participant for
three regions of the table (see Table 1); the region in peripersonal space (the ﬁrst three locations were
reachable by all participants), the next three locations (in extrapersonal space), and the last three
more distal locations. There were main effects of distance, F(2,48) = 30.40, p < .0001, partial
g2 = .559, and who placed the object, F(1,24) = 5.79, p = .02, partial g2 = .194; participants used this
most in peripersonal space (M = 63%), less in extrapersonal space (M = 32%), and least in the furthest
locations (M = 15%), and this was used more for objects placed by participants (M = 40%) than when
the objects were placed by the experimenter (M = 30%). Of most interest was a main effect of owner-
ship, F(1,24) = 7.44, p = .01, partial g2 = .237 (Fig. 3). Thiswas used more for the participant-owned ob-
jects (M = 41%) than for the experimenter-owned objects (M = 32%), regardless of who placed them
(Fig. 3). None of the interactions were signiﬁcant (all F < 1.3).
These data replicate the results of Coventry et al. (2008), showing that the use of this and thatmap
onto the peripersonal–extrapersonal space distinction, and also that participant placement of an ob-
ject results in a greater use of this compared to experimenter placements of those same objects. The
results are also informative regarding the nature of the ‘who places’ effect. This effect is interpreted inTable 1
Percentage of ‘‘THIS’’ responses in each condition across the three regions in Experiments 1, 3 and 5.
Experiment Condition Region 1
(25–75 cm)
Region 2
(100–
150 cm)
Region 3
(175–
225 cm)
Mean SEM Mean SEM Mean SEM
1-Ownership Participant Placed Participant’s Coins 68.00 6.52 48.00 6.69 18.67 5.80
Experimenter’s Coins 62.67 8.01 28.00 6.85 13.33 5.77
Experimenter Placed Participant’s Coins 64.00 7.68 29.33 6.75 17.33 5.81
Experimenter’s Coins 56.00 7.87 24.00 5.62 9.33 4.52
3-Visibility Metal (Occluded) 41.18 7.84 15.69 7.07 3.92 2.68
Glass (visible but not touchable) 50.98 8.14 27.45 9.58 5.88 4.27
No cover (visible and touchable) 60.78 7.69 21.57 6.35 9.80 4.75
5-Familiarity Familiar Shapes 50.76 6.53 39.39 6.06 31.82 5.90
Unfamiliar Shapes 33.33 6.39 28.03 5.94 33.33 6.30
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Fig. 3. Main effects of object knowledge found across Experiments 1–6. The top panel shows the results of the demonstrative
experiments (mean percentage use of this by condition), and the bottom panel shows the memory results (mean signed distance
errors: note that a positive value indicates remembering an object as being further away than it actually was). Error bars
represent standard errors of the mean.
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possibility that the ‘who places’ effect might be a result of contact and agency instilling a sense of
ownership of the object. We have shown that ownership is indeed an important inﬂuence on the
choice of this or that in English. However, the presence of a ‘who places’ effect even when ownership
is explicitly indicated militates against the explanation that the ‘who places’ effect is about ownership.4. Experiment 2 – Ownership and memory for object location
The goal of this experiment was to investigate the inﬂuence of ownership on immediate memory
for object location. It has been argued that object location memory involves multiple components,
including remembering objects, remembering locations, and the binding of objects to locations (Post-
ma & De Haan, 1996). There is some evidence for the distinctiveness of these processes with respect to
multiple object spatial arrays (see Postma, Izendoorn, & De Haan, 1998 for discussion), but little is
known about the object to location binding process. One might think that location memory is all that
is required when remembering the location of a single object, and that information about the object
may be secondary. For example, Jiang, Olson, and Chun (2000) have suggested that location may act as
an anchor for the features of an object to be bound to, and that as a consequence, object location mem-
ory is unaffected by object characteristics. Yet there is some reason to believe that object knowledge
might affect memory for location.
It is well established that people exhibit memory errors for the last seen position of a moving ob-
ject, misremembering the last position as further on in its projected path (‘representational momen-
tum’; Freyd, 1983; see Hubbard, 2005 for a recent review). Reed and Vinson (1996) found that
representational momentum effects are mediated by knowledge of the object that is seen moving.
For example, labeling the same object in different ways (e.g. a ‘rocket’ versus a ‘cathedral’) affects
memory for the last position of that object when it is seen moving along its (expected) path. There
is also some evidence that the gender stereotyping of an object affects memory for location (Cherney
& Ryalls, 1999; Gallagher, Neave, Hamilton, & Gray, 2006). Hence, we thought it possible that other
object knowledge properties also affect memory for static object location – with implications for ac-
counts of object location memory.
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and how people naturally interact with objects. Cunningham et al. (2008) had participants move cards
into their own shopping basket or someone else’s. Memory for the cards placed in their own basket
was better than for those placed in someone else’s basket. These results can be interpreted as an effect
of ownership on memory. Interestingly, they found no effect of whether the object was moved by the
participant or a conspeciﬁc, suggesting that ownership effects on memory are not the same as agency
effects (further supporting our interpretation of the ‘who places’ effect found in Experiment 1).
Using a different method, Shi, Zhou, Han, and Liu (2011); see also Walla, Greiner, Duregger, Deecke,
& Thurner, 2007) examined the effect of possessive pronouns (my/his Chinese equivalents) on reaction
times to identify the color of the font nouns were written in. Participants were quicker to react to the
nouns when the noun was proceeded by my. Moreover, in a surprise memory task nouns in the my
condition were remembered better than those in the his condition.
Constable et al. (2011) provide direct evidence that ownership affects visuomotor interactions with
objects. In one experiment, participants were instructed to reach and replace mugs either owned by
them, the experimenter, or with ownership unmarked. Constable et al. found that movement patterns,
including maximum acceleration of the arm during movement and lateral and dorsal distances tra-
versed, were affected by ownership. In particular, objects owned were moved closer to the body than
objects either owned by the experimenter, or unmarked for ownership.
Building on these earlier results we wanted to test whether ownership affects memory for object
location when objects are presented in space at varying distances from the perceiver – and of course if
effects of ownership and distance parallel the effects we have found for language in Experiment 1. In
order to retain equivalence for the language experiments, we tested memory for coin locations placed
on the dot locations used in Experiment 1, but we included additional locations so that dots were
spaced at 12.5 cm distances (while also omitting some of the distances in extrapersonal space furthest
away from participants).
The experiment employed a 2 (ownership)  9 (distance) design.
4.1. Method
4.1.1. Participants
Twenty-two participants (4 male) were recruited from the student and local community popula-
tions. Their average age was 20 years (range 18–39 years), and all were monolingual native speakers
of English. Participants took part for (nominal) payment.
4.1.2. Procedure
Participants were seated at the same table used in Experiment 1 (and in all the experiments), on
which 9 colored dots (each a different color) were placed at 12.5 cm intervals down the midline di-
rectly in front of participants, starting at 25 cm from the end of the table where they were seated.
Participants were told that they were taking part in an experiment on memory for object location
(language was not mentioned at all). They were then given their participation payment in the form of
coins (as in Experiment 1), and were told that their coins would be used as stimuli in the experiment.
On each trial participants watched the experimenter place either one of her own coins, or one of the
participants’ (which took 2 s) on one of the colored dots. This was done to match the experimenter
places condition in the demonstrative experiment. Once placed, participants had 10 s to view the coin
before being asked to close their eyes for 20 s. This gave the experimenter time to remove the dots and
coin, and to get behind a screen (to avoid distracting the participant) and to position a measuring stick
across the table. The stick was half the width of the table (attached to a set square for precision) and
was placed at a set distance (10 cm or 20 cm) further away/nearer the participant than where the ob-
ject had appeared. Two distances were used to prevent the stick placement becoming a cue for the
object location. When the participant opened his/her eyes again, he/she indicated to the experimenter
how the stick should be moved to be aligned with the near edge of the object (where it had been
placed) using the commands ‘closer’, ‘further’, and ‘stop’. On debrief participants did not spot any sys-
tematic stick placements (borne out in the memory data). At the beginning of the experiment partic-
ipants were given 6 practice trials.
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ment 1) was the absence of pointing in this experiment. The goal of this and the other memory exper-
iments reported below was to investigate the inﬂuence of object knowledge properties on memory for
object location. If participants pointed at an object while it was visible, this would have matched the
method in the language experiments, but it may also have introduced a confound in a memory con-
text. Pointing at an object when it is present provides an additional distance cue for recall. For that
reason, participants kept their arms by their side in the present experiment (but see Experiment 7).
4.2. Results and discussion
The accuracy for object memory location was calculated by subtracting the actual distance of the
object from the distance estimate (i.e. ﬁnal position of the stick); positive numbers (in cm) indicate an
object remembered as being further away from the participant than it actually was. The mean distance
estimates are displayed in Table 2. These data were submitted to a 2(ownership)  9(distance) ANO-
VA. There was a main effect of ownership, F(1,21) = 25.26, p < .0001, partial g2 = .546. While generally
there was a tendency to misremember objects as further away from participants than they actually
were, estimates were more accurate for objects owned by the participants (M = 1.46) than for objects
owned by the experimenter (M = 3.52). There was also a main effect of distance, F(8,168) = 5.58,
p < .0001, partial g2 = .210 (Table 2). The furthest three distances (in extrapersonal space) were asso-
ciated with signiﬁcantly further distance estimates relative to the actual distances than the nearest
three locations (all p < .05). The interaction between distance and ownership was not reliable (F < 1.5).
Overall, participants were quite accurate in their memory for object locations (with a distance error
of 3% on average), which suggests that guesses were minimal, and that the task was at the right level
of difﬁculty. The effect of distance mirrors the effect found for Experiment 1. Distances unambiguously
in extra-personal space were associated with remembering objects further away than they actually
were compared to distances unambiguously in peripersonal space.
The effect of ownership found here is consistent both with the results of Cunningham et al. (2008)
and Constable et al. (2011). The improved accuracy for objects owned by participants over objects
owned by someone else mirrors the effect reported by Cunningham et al. (2008), but in the case of
the present study objects were placed in the dorsal plane, and the memory measure was for object
location rather than memory for objects. The data are also consistent with the direct object place-
ments data found in Constable et al. (2011). In their case participants placed an object closer to them-
selves when they owned that object; in the present Experiment the object was remembered as being
closer when it was owned by participants rather than owned by the experimenter.Table 2
Absolute memory errors (cm) in each condition by distance in Experiments 2, 4 and 6.
Experiment Condition 25 cm 37.5 cm 50 cm 62.5 cm 75 cm 87.5 cm 100 cm 112.5 cm 125 cm
Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean
(SEM) (SEM) (SEM) (SEM) (SEM) (SEM) (SEM) (SEM) (SEM)
2-Ownership Participant’s Coins 0.42 0.36 0.76 0.69 1.68 1.50 1.89 2.48 3.38
(0.54) (0.45) (0.58) (0.6) (0.49) (0.7) (0.69) (0.72) (1.15)
Experimenter’s Coins 0.35 0.94 2.83 2.60 3.03 3.91 6.74 5.11 6.14
(0.67) (0.48) (0.93) (0.88) (0.86) (0.97) (2.43) (0.95) (1.24)
4-Visibility Metal (Occluded) 2.91 1.96 2.79 3.55 2.17 3.50 3.38 5.28 6.39
(2.09) (0.55) (0.7) (1.02) (1.07) (0.71) (0.76) (1.02) (1.08)
Glass (visible but not touchable) 1.37 1.67 1.03 0.95 0.43 1.85 1.97 0.61 3.45
(0.42) (0.82) (1.13) (1.07) (0.99) (0.76) (0.99) (1.17) (1.00)
No cover (visible and touchable) 0.09 0.65 0.52 0.08 1.40 1.78 2.08 1.35 3.24
(0.29) (1.02) (0.57) (0.73) (0.93) (0.52) (0.97) (0.91) (0.92)
6-Familiarity Familiar shapes 0.26 0.24 0.12 0.03 0.03 0.97 1.62 0.95 2.22
(0.47) (0.48) (0.56) (0.8) (0.59) (1.09) (1.10) (1.26) (0.94)
Unfamiliar shapes 2.04 2.42 2.70 3.26 5.09 4.88 4.48 4.59 5.49
(0.44) (0.76) (0.69) (0.83) (1.00) (0.87) (0.78) (0.67) (0.85)
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object location memory. In order to perform the task, participants could have ignored the object
(who owns it), and could have focused on the location alone. The present data hint at the automaticity
of object knowledge access in object location memory – a point we will return to later.
5. Experiment 3 – Visibility and demonstrative choice
In this experiment we examined the possible inﬂuence on English demonstrative choice of a second
distinction that is commonly lexicalized across languages (Chandralal, 2010; Diessel, 1999) – visibil-
ity. To do so, the objects to be described were either uncovered, or covered with a metal (opaque) con-
tainer or covered with a glass (clear) container of the same size. We included both visible and invisible
covered conditions to control for physical accessibility (Enﬁeld, 2003; Piwek, Beun, & Cremers, 2008);
a covered (invisible) object is both invisible and inaccessible while a glass cover is visible but inacces-
sible. If visibility is important for demonstrative choice we expected that the use of this should be less
frequent in the metal cover condition compared with the other two conditions. Note that such a result
would be consistent with recent work on peripersonal space showing that visibility, not accessibility,
affects reaching trajectories to objects following the observation of a conspeciﬁc (Grifﬁths & Tipper,
2009). If, on the other hand, physical accessibility is important, then there should be differences in
demonstrative choice comparing both the covered conditions to the uncovered (control) condition.
5.1. Method
The method was the same as for Experiment 1, with three differences. First, the participant always
placed the objects. Second, the objects to be placed were colored shapes on plastic disks 6.5 cm in
diameter (as used in Coventry et al., 2008). Third, the visibility of the placed objects was manipulated.
On placing the disks, participants either left them uncovered, or placed them and covered them with a
glass or a metal container (8 cm in diameter and 9 cm high) – see Fig. 1.
5.1.1. Participants
Seventeen participants (5 male) were recruited from the student and local community populations.
Their average age was 23 years (range 19–40 years), and they were all monolingual native speakers of
English. Participants took part for (nominal) payment or course credit.
5.1.2. Procedure
The procedure was the same as that used in Experiment 1. The experimenter read out instruction
cards indicating which disk to place on which uniquely colored dot, and whether or not the object was
to be covered with the glass, metal container, or left uncovered. The experimenter read out the
instruction of the form OBJECT NAME, DOT COLOR, COVER (e.g. ‘‘red square, blue dot, metal’’).
5.2. Results and discussion
As in Experiment 1, we calculated the percentage use of this for each participant for the three re-
gions of the table (displayed in Table 1). There was a main effect of distance, F(2,32) = 22.24, p < .0001,
partial g2 = .582, mirroring the effect found in Experiment 1. There was also a main effect of visibility,
F(2,32) = 8.24, p = .0001, partial g2 = .340. This was used less when the objects were covered with the
metal container (M = 20%) compared to either the glass cover condition (M = 28%, p = .02) or the no
cover condition (M = 30%, p = .001). There was no difference between the uncovered and glass cover
conditions (p = .60). The interaction between location and visibility was not reliable (F = 1.2).
The results of the covering manipulation favor an explanation based on visibility rather than phys-
ical accessibility. The absence of a difference between the glass cover condition and the no cover con-
dition shows that preventing contact with an object does not affect demonstrative choice – it is
whether the object is visible or not that matters. This does not rule out some notion of ‘mental’ acces-
sibility as important for demonstrative choice (Piwek et al., 2008), but of course that begs the question
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generated in some way from a more basic spatial ‘physical’ accessibility or ‘control’ (see Brovold &
Grush, 2012; Maes, 2007), then the absence of an interaction between distance and the visibility
manipulation is telling.
6. Experiment 4 – Visibility and memory for object location
Visibility is explicit in the demonstrative systems of some languages, and the previous experiment
has shown that visibility matters for demonstrative choice in English. If the inﬂuence of visibility on
demonstratives emerges from some non-linguistic perceptual impact of visibility, then one should
ﬁnd that visibility affects memory for/perception of object location. That was the goal of this
experiment.
6.1. Method
6.1.1. Participants
Twelve participants (4 male) were recruited from the student and local community populations.
Their average age was 29 years (range 19–57 years), and they were all monolingual native speakers
of English. Participants took part for (nominal) payment or course credit.
6.1.2. Procedure
The procedure was the same as in Experiment 2, with one difference. The experimenter placed the
colored disk for two seconds uncovered, and then either covered it or not and left it for a further 10 s
(covered in the metal and glass conditions). The covers were always placed with the edge of the cover
touching the near edge of the object (so that distances were equivalent in all conditions).
6.2. Results and discussion
The mean distance error estimates are displayed in Table 2. These data were submitted to a 3(vis-
ibility)  9(distance) ANOVA. There was a main effect of visibility, F(2,22) = 17.51, p < .0001, partial
g2 = .614. While generally there was a tendency to misremember objects as further away from partic-
ipants than they actually were, estimates were signiﬁcantly further away relative to actual distance
when the object was covered with the metal container (M = 3.546) than for either the objects covered
with the glass (M = 1.481) or uncovered objects (M = 1.061)(both p < .001). There was no difference be-
tween the glass cover and uncovered conditions (p > .05). There was also a main effect of distance,
F(8,88) = 6.65, p < .005, partial g2 = .249. The distance estimates (relative to actual distances) for posi-
tions in extrapersonal space were higher than those in peripersonal space (see Table 2), but the only
distance reliably greater than those in peripersonal space was the furthest distance (all p < .001). The
interaction between distance and visibility was not reliable (F < 1).
The inﬂuence of visibility on memory for object location mirrors directly the effect of visibility on
demonstrative choice. Objects that are covered and not visible are recalled as further away than the
same objects that were either covered with a glass (hence, still visible) or uncovered. Visibility affects
memory for object location just as it affects how one talks about objects that are still co-present.
7. Experiment 5 – Familiarity and demonstrative choice
In this experiment we considered a further variable that had yet to be tested with respect to inﬂu-
ence on demonstrative choice or distance perception/memory – familiarity. The motivation to con-
sider familiarity was as follows.
Objects owned by a person are more likely to occur closer to a person (the owner) than objects that
are not owned. Objects that are visible are more likely to be located near a person than objects that are
not visible. By the same token, objects that are familiar to a person are more likely to occur near a per-
son than objects that are unfamiliar. If this (simple) account of these effects is correct (and we elab-
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ject location.
A second motivation for testing familiarity (as we shall argue later, not unrelated to the account we
have just given) comes from work on ‘mental’ accessibility. In the broader context of demonstrative
use in discourse settings, (mental) accessibility is glossed as the ease with which particular mental
entities/objects come to mind (Piwek et al., 2008). It is plausible that familiar objects may be more
mentally accessible than unfamiliar objects with consequences for demonstrative choice (see Curby
& Gauthier, 2009, for a related account of expertise and object categorization).
The (related) notions of learned associations between objects and locations, and mental accessibil-
ity of objects, were the motivation to test the possible impact of object familiarity on the use of this
and that. It was predicted that this would be used more for familiar objects (e.g. red square, yellow
circle) as compared with unfamiliar objects (e.g. viridian nonagon, cerulean ranunculoid).
7.1. Method
7.1.1. Participants
Twenty-two participants (3 male) were recruited from the student and local community popula-
tions. Their average age was 20 years (range 18–42 years), and they were all monolingual native
speakers of English. Participants took part for (nominal) payment or course credit.
7.1.2. Procedure
The procedure was the same as in Experiment 3. After the general procedure of the experiment was
explained participants were introduced to the shapes. For the unfamiliar shapes, participants were gi-
ven time to practice pronunciation and recall of the names and colors of the shapes, so that they would
then be able to correctly select the color/shape for placement and description. The training was suc-
cessful as no participants failed to select the correct disk to place on any trial, and they were all cor-
rectly named when describing.
7.2. Results and discussion
Again, we computed the percentage use of this for each participant for each of the three regions
(see Table 1). There was a main effect of familiarity, F(1,21) = 7.40, p = .01, partial g2 = .261. Overall,
this was used more frequently for familiar objects (M = 41%) than for unfamiliar objects (M = 32%).
The effect of object location was not reliable, F(2,42) = 2.20, p = .12, partial g2 = .095, though the direc-
tion was consistent with the data from Experiments 1 and 3. However, the interaction between famil-
iarity and location was reliable, F(2,42) = 4.59, p = .02, partial g2 = .180. The effect of location was
present for familiar, F(2,42) = 5.31, p = .009, partial g2 = .202, but not for unfamiliar objects,
F(2,42) = 0.54, p = .59, partial g2 = .025. That was used predominately for unfamiliar objects irrespec-
tive of location.
The main effect of object familiarity on demonstrative choice in English supports the idea that ob-
jects that are unfamiliar are expected to be further away than they are and/or the notion that familiar
objects are more mentally accessible, with consequences for demonstrative choice. The absence of a
main effect of distance in this experimentwas driven by the lack of distance effect for unfamiliar objects.
Consistent with the results of Experiments 1 and 3, the use of familiar objects produced an effect of dis-
tance. In contrast, when the objects were unfamiliar the use of that approached ceiling even in periper-
sonal space. The next experiment examines this inﬂuence of familiarity on memory for object location.8. Experiment 6 – Familiarity and memory for object location
Object familiarity has been shown to affect demonstrative choice in the previous experiment. If the
inﬂuence of familiarity on demonstratives emerges from some non-linguistic perceptual impact of
familiarity, then one should ﬁnd that familiarity should also affect memory for/perception of object
location.
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been shown that familiar objects are associated with improvement in short term visual memory
capacity (e.g. Anaki & Bentin, 2009; Curby & Gauthier, 2009; Curby, Glazek, & Gauthier, 2009) and with
increased ease of object tracking as a familiar object moves (Pinto, Howe, Cohen, & Horowitz, 2010).
However, there is a paucity of research that looks at the impact of familiarity on memory for object
location. Given the ﬁndings of the above experiments (and Experiment 5 in particular), we suspected
that familiarity might also affect memory for object location.
8.1. Method
8.1.1. Participants
Nineteen participants (6 male) were recruited from the student and local community populations.
Their average age was 28 years (range 19–47 years), and they were all monolingual native speakers of
English. Participants took part for (nominal) payment or course credit.
8.1.2. Procedure
The procedure was same as in Experiment 4, with the addition of the same introduction to the
familiar/unfamiliar objects as used as in Experiment 5.
8.2. Results
The mean distance error estimates were submitted to a 2(familiarity)  9(distance) ANOVA. There
was a main effect of familiarity, F(1,18) = 82.25, p < .00001, partial g2 = .820. While generally there
was a tendency to misremember objects as further away from participants than they actually were,
estimates were more accurate for familiar objects (M = 0.634) than for unfamiliar objects
(M = 3.883). The main effect of distance was also reliable, F(8,44) = 4.46, p < .005, partial g2 = .161.
The furthest four locations were associated with greater distance errors than the nearest four locations
(all p < .05). No other contrasts were reliable. The interaction between familiarity and distance was not
reliable (F < 1).
These results show that object familiarity affects object location memory. We can consider possible
explanations as to why this might be the case. One might think that unfamiliar object names may cre-
ate greater memory load, resulting in poorer memory performance, but this was not the case – mem-
ory for object location for unfamiliar objects was similar to memory for familiar objects overall, and
the direction of the errors were systematic rather than arbitrary. Consistent with the inﬂuence of ob-
ject familiarity on choice of demonstratives (Experiment 5), the general tendency to misremember
unfamiliar objects as further away than they actually were can be accounted for based on either some
effort-based/accessibility-based parameter, where more effort to remember is associated with in-
creased distance. Alternatively, the expectation that familiar objects are generally closer than unfamil-
iar objects may also account for this ﬁnding. As we argue below, consideration of the experimental
results on balance militates in favor of an expectation-based account of both memory for object loca-
tion, and choice of language to describe object location.9. Experiment 7
Experiments 1–6 show parallels between spatial demonstrative choice to describe object location
and memory for the distance an object is placed. But what is the nature of this relationship? There are
several possible positions on the relation between spatial language and non-linguistic spatial repre-
sentation, helpfully enumerated in discussions of the mapping between spatial adpositions and spatial
representation by a range of authors (see Crawford et al., 2000; Landau & Hoffman, 2005; Munnich
et al., 2001, for discussion). First, many have claimed that language is parasitic on non-linguistic spa-
tial perception and memory, with language reﬂecting universal representations of space (Clark, 1973;
Jackendoff, 1983; Landau & Jackendoff, 1993; Mandler, 1996; Talmy, 1983). More broadly, such a view
is consistent with recent ‘embodied’ approaches to cognition, with language directly grounded in non-
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has been claimed by some that spatial categories themselves are shaped by language (Bowerman,
1996; Brown & Levinson, 1993; Levinson, 2003; Majid, Bowerman, Kita, Haun, & Levinson, 2004;
Pederson et al., 1998). Therefore the speciﬁc language one speaks impacts upon the (non-linguistic)
spatial categories one has – and this is most clearly the case when one can use language at encoding
during a (supposed) non-linguistic task (for discussion see Li et al., 2011; Frank, Everett, Fedorenko, &
Gibson, 2008). Third, some have argued that there may be a common set of constraints underlying
both language and perception, and speciﬁcally that language and memory might both independently
draw on the same set of spatial properties (Crawford et al., 2000).
The main goal of this experiment was to begin to unpack the relationship between demonstrative
use and non-linguistic perception. To do so we ﬁrst introduced a new condition into the memory par-
adigm, a verbal interference condition (modeled on Trueswell & Papafragou, 2010), where participants
repeated phonemes out loud during exposure to the object in the memory game. If language is used as
a tool to remember object location (Li et al., 2011; see also Frank et al., 2008), then the verbal inter-
ference condition should eliminate object knowledge effects. In contrast, if the object knowledge ef-
fects remain under conditions of verbal interference, one can assume that object knowledge effects
either have to do with language drawing on non-linguistic spatial perception and memory, or that
both the language of space and non-linguistic memory for object location are both affected by the
same underlying processes.
The second goal of this experiment was to examine the relationship between object knowledge ef-
fects in language and memory for space directly by testing individual participants across both para-
digms. If language is parasitic on memory for object location, then one should ﬁnd that the people
who exhibit the biggest effects of object knowledge on demonstrative choice should also show the big-
gest effects of object knowledge on memory for object location. In this Experiment we used a within
participants design to test this hypothesis; each participant ﬁrst took part in the memory experiment
without verbal interference, with verbal interference, followed later by the language experiment.
The third goal was to iron out differences in the previous language and memory paradigms by
using the same locations across all conditions and by getting participants to point during encoding
in the memory conditions, thus making the language and memory paradigms identical. We chose
familiarity as the object manipulation, given the interaction between familiarity and distance in
Experiment 5 (the only interaction in any of the experiments), and the absence of this interaction
in Experiment 6. Also, as a consequence of opportunity sampling in the previous experiments the
majority of participants were female, leaving open the possibility that our results could be skewed gi-
ven some previous ﬁndings of sex differences in memory for objects and object location (see Voyer,
Postma, Brake, & Imperato-McGinley, 2007 for a review). Therefore we tested an equal number of male
and female participants in this experiment.
The experiment employed a 2 (gender)  2 (object familiarity)  3 (task; memory without verbal
interference, memory with verbal interference, language)  6 (location) mixed design.
9.1. Method
9.1.1. Participants
Thirty-two participants (16 male) were recruited from the student and local community popula-
tions. Their average age was 23 years (range 19–38 years), and all were monolingual native speakers
of English. Participants took part for (nominal) payment.
9.1.2. Procedure
The table set-up was the same as in the previous experiments. Nine colored dots were placed at
25 cm intervals down the midline directly in front of participants, starting at 25 cm from the end of
the table where they were seated. But this time for both language and memory paradigms objects
were presented at only the ﬁrst 6 locations; 3 in peripersonal space and 3 in extrapersonal space
(to make the whole experiment a manageable length for participants).
The experiment was divided into three parts, presented in the same order for each participant. The
ﬁrst part examined memory for object location for familiar and unfamiliar objects, without verbal
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One difference in this experiment, however, was that participants were additionally asked to point
at the disks while viewing them in all conditions. There were 24 randomized trials, prior to which par-
ticipants were given 6 practice trials.
Part two of the experiment was identical to part one expect that participants were asked to carry
out an articulatory suppression task whilst viewing the disks. They were asked to repeat the sounds Ba
Be Bi Bo Bu in a loop. This task was chosen as it has previously been used for spatial tasks (Garden,
Cornoldi, & Logie, 2002), and is similar to the suppression procedure used by Trueswell and Papafr-
agou (2010).
Part three of the study used the memory game methodology from Experiment 5 to tap demonstra-
tive choice. Participants remained seated whilst the disks were placed by the experimenter. Partici-
pants were given 6 practice trials and 24 randomized trials.
9.2. Results and discussion
The data are displayed in Table 3. First we considered the language data. We computed the per-
centage use of this for each participant in peripersonal versus extrapersonal space. The data were ana-
lysed using a 2(gender)  2(familiarity)  2(location) mixed ANOVA. There was a main effect of
familiarity, F(1,30) = 13.04, p < .005, partial g2 = .303. Participants used this more for familiar objects
(M = 50%) than for unfamiliar objects (M = 39%). There was also a main effect of object location,
F(1,30) = 12.29, p < .005, partial g2 = .291. Participants used thismore for near locations (M = 55%) than
for far locations (M = 33%). There was also a main effect of gender, F(1,30) = 6.49, p < .05, partial
g2 = .178. Overall women used this (M = 52%) more than men (M = 36%). None of the interactions were
reliable.
These data replicate the effect of familiarity on demonstrative choice found in Experiment 5, but
the interaction between familiarity and distance has been replaced here by a main effect of distance
alone, consistent with the results of the previous experiments manipulating other object parameters.
The main effect of gender found here on demonstrative choice suggests that future studies would do
well to consider spatial language gender differences more comprehensively, but the absence of any
interactions of the variables of interest with gender indicate that the results are robust across both
men and women.
We next considered the memory conditions. The errors were analysed using a 2(gender)  2(mem-
ory condition: no interference, interference)  2(object familiarity)  6(object location) mixed ANO-
VA. The results produced a main effect of object familiarity, F(1,30) = 42.67, p < .0001, partial
g2 = .587. Participants were more accurate for familiar objects (M = 2.113) than for unfamiliar objectsTable 3
Language and memory data by object and distance in Experiment 7.
25 cm 50 cm 75 cm 100 cm 125 cm 150 cm
Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean
(SEM) (SEM) (SEM) (SEM) (SEM) (SEM)
Memory* (without interference) Familiar shapes 0.74 0.73 1.18 2.17 3.42 4.73
(0.41) (0.51) (0.87) (0.77) (0.83) (0.90)
Unfamiliar shapes 1.53 1.68 3.92 3.37 5.31 7.68
(0.47) (0.52) (0.68) (0.69) (0.87) (1.07)
Memory* (with interference) Familiar shapes 0.93 1.48 1.92 1.82 2.31 3.91
(0.52) (0.77) (0.64) (0.71) (0.87) (0.87)
Unfamiliar shapes 2.41 2.37 4.02 3.89 4.07 6.13
(0.45) (0.54) (0.60) (0.79) (0.83) (0.72)
Language** Familiar shapes 68.75 57.81 48.44 46.88 39.06 37.50
(7.36) (7.48) (6.54) (7.42) (5.83) (7.10)
Unfamiliar shapes 57.81 51.56 48.44 23.44 32.81 18.75
* Absolute error (cm).
** Percentage use of ‘‘THIS’’.
Fig. 4. Scatterplot showing the difference in average percentage use of ‘‘THIS’’ between familiar and unfamiliar conditions
against the difference in average memory error between familiar and unfamiliar conditions.
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g2 = .405. The locations in extrapersonal space were associated with increased distance migration
compared to the ﬁrst three locations (all p < .05). None of the other main effects or interactions were
reliable (all F < 1.9).
These results reveal that memory for object location is unaffected by verbal interference during the
task; there were no interactions between condition and any of the variables of interest. So we can dis-
count the possibility that participants in the memory tasks used language as a tool with which to aid
their memory performance (see Frank et al., 2008; Li et al., 2011). We also failed to ﬁnd any gender
differences in object location memory, ameliorating possible concerns that the effects found in the
previous experiments may be a consequence of the majority of participants being female.
Next we wanted to establish if there is a direct relationship between object location memory on the
one hand, and language on the other. To do so, for each individual participant we computed the dif-
ference between the percentage use of this for the familiar versus the unfamiliar objects, and also the
difference in memory for distance for the familiar versus the unfamiliar objects. The relationship be-
tween these measures is shown in Fig. 4. There was a signiﬁcant correlation between measures,
r(30) = 0.431, p = .007 (one-tailed). As participants exhibited a greater difference between the per-
centage use of this for familiar compared to unfamiliar objects, so too did they exhibit a greater differ-
ence in location memory for the familiar versus unfamiliar objects; a higher use of this for familiar
versus unfamiliar objects is associated with a much greater (negative) difference in memory for dis-
tance for the familiar versus unfamiliar objects. This result is informative regarding the nature of
the relationship between the use of demonstratives and (non-linguistic) spatial representation – a
point we consider in detail below.10. General discussion
The choice of spatial demonstratives in English has been shown to be affected by a range of new
parameters – ownership, visibility and familiarity – in addition to parameters (e.g. distance) previ-
ously identiﬁed as important for their use. And corresponding effects have been found for a non-lin-
guistic task tapping memory for object location. We ﬁrst consider the language and memory results
separately, before considering exactly how they map onto one another.
10.1. Spatial demonstratives
In all the demonstrative experiments there was a clear mapping between peripersonal versus
extrapersonal space and choice of demonstratives in English. As objects move outside reachable dis-
tance into extrapersonal space, there is a graded fall off in the use of this, consistent with previous re-
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from peripersonal to extrapersonal space (Longo & Lourenco, 2006). Experiment 1 also further tested
between two accounts of the ‘who places’ effect (Coventry et al., 2008) – ownership versus previous
contact in peripersonal space – coming down in favor of the latter.
The main results of interest are the new ﬁndings that ownership, visibility and familiarity all affect
choice of spatial demonstratives in English. These results are important for three reasons. First, the
motivation for testing these parameters came in part from distinctions made in the demonstrative sys-
tems of other languages. If a common set of parameters affect demonstrative choice across languages,
then one should ﬁnd that parameters lexicalized in some languages are nevertheless important for the
choice of terms in a language that does not make those explicit lexical distinctions. We have found
that this is the case. Visibility and ownership, explicitly lexicalized in languages such as Sinhalese
and Supyire respectively, affect the choice of this and that in English. This provides a challenge to
one of the main drivers of work commonly referred to under the rubric of ‘linguistic relativity’. Testing
for cross-cultural differences in (non-linguistic) cognition on the basis of language differences is often
based on the assumption that lexical distinctions are what is important about those terms in a lan-
guage. Speakers may use distinctions in their speciﬁc language as a tool with which to remember
or process spatial information (see for example Li et al., 2011; Frank et al., 2008), but those distinctions
do not necessarily capture how those terms are actually used within a language, nor the mapping be-
tween that language and the perceptual systems of those speakers.
Building on the current results, it will be important to test speakers using the memory game across
a range of languages employing different demonstrative systems to establish if the explicit distinc-
tions demonstrative systems make translate into greater weighting for those parameters. For instance
in a language, such as Sinhalese, which purportedly makes lexical distinctions based on object visibil-
ity, it will be informative to see whether visibility impacts upon demonstrative choice more than it
does for English, which does not lexicalise visibility explicitly (but does exhibit a large visibility effect
nevertheless). In that regard, it is worth noting that distance in English impacted upon demonstrative
choice more than any of the object knowledge effects in the present Experiments (see Table 1), and
English has been assumed by most researchers to exhibit a proximal–distal demonstrative contrast.
The second reason why these effects are informative is that they offer rare data about demonstra-
tive usage collected in a tight experimental setting. As Enﬁeld (2003) has noted, most work on demon-
stratives has been based either on intuition, or collected from (often restricted) discourse contexts
where the spatial environment being referred to is not present. Under these conditions it is hard to
infer anything about the mapping between spatial demonstratives and perceptual space, and indeed
one might argue that assumptions about the meaning of demonstratives across languages are on sha-
ky ground. In contrast, the memory game task setting affords experimental control while also eliciting
spatial demonstratives without participants being aware that demonstrative choice is being investi-
gated. Although not a dialogical setting, we believe that the control the method offers gives good data
regarding actual demonstrative use, more than compensating for the absence of complete conversa-
tional and naturalistic authenticity.
Third, the demonstrative data on their own challenge previous accounts of the meaning of demon-
stratives which have attempted to reduce their meaning to a single catch-all parameter. Several ac-
counts of demonstratives have assumed that this and that in English, when used spatially, map onto
a clean binary proximal–distal contrast from which other uses originate (Diessel, 2005; Maes,
2007). Moreover, Maes (2007) has proposed that a near–far image schema also affords extension to
other types of (endophoric) demonstrative use. In spite of evidence in our experiments that the peri-
personal–extrapersonal distinction is important for demonstrative choice, this distinction does not ac-
count for effects of visibility, ownership and familiarity. In particular, the absence of interactions
between any of these variables and distance suggests that demonstrative choice in English is affected
by more than a single parameter.
Leaving aside the peripersonal–extrapersonal distinction, some have argued that more discourse-
related distinctions, such as joint attention, or more abstract notions such as accessibility, may rival a
spatial distinction in terms of ‘basicness’ underlying demonstrative use (Burenhult, 2003; Piwek et al.,
2008). Diessel (2006) proposes that both the indication of location of a referent relative to the deictic
centre and coordination of interlocutors’ joint attention focus are the two central (and closely related)
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active settings, Enﬁeld (2003) offers a stripped back semantics for these terms, with rich pragmatic
(situational) factors ﬂeshing out the basic semantic notions of not-here for nan in Lao (equivalent of
that) and no information for nii (equivalent of this). Enﬁeld assumes that the association of nii with
proximal comes from rich contextual knowledge (pragmatics), rather from any core spatial knowledge
associated with the semantics.
It is undeniable that demonstratives can be used in a variety of different contexts, and it has been
shown convincingly that common ground plays an important role in the use of these terms in dialog-
ical settings (Clark, 1996; Clark, Schreuder, & Buttrick, 1983). Yet acknowledging that demonstrative
use is rich and varied does not undermine the idea that spatial demonstratives might also be used in
systematic ways mapping onto the perception of space. In our experiments the experimenter and par-
ticipant were sitting side-by-side, with equal object visibility. And the interaction between participant
and experimenter was minimal, meaning that the focus was on the spatial determinants of demon-
strative choice. In this context, we think it unlikely that the effects found are ‘pragmatic’ in the sense
proposed by Enﬁeld (2003). Moreover, there is evidence that more pragmatic determinants of demon-
strative choice appear later on in development (see Küntay & Özyürek, 2006), consistent with the view
that spatial demonstrative use based around a deictic centre is primary, with other uses emerging
later.
Consideration of spatial demonstratives in light of research on other types of spatial language also
provides a challenge to the view that a single parameter might act as a catch-all for the semantics of
these terms. Reviewing a large body of experimental studies examining how the comprehension and
production of spatial prepositions covaries with changes to the relative positions of objects and object
properties, Coventry and Garrod (2004) conclude that words such as in and over are dependent on sev-
eral interlocking parameters (geometric relations, object knowledge, and dynamic functional relations
between objects). So why would one expect spatial demonstratives to only be about geometric loca-
tion or object knowledge?
While consideration of the demonstrative results on their own merits attention, it is only through
comparison with non-linguistic task data can one establish whether there is a mapping between lan-
guage and non-linguistic spatial representation. As we argued at the outset, linguists have often used
somewhat caricatured notions of the near-far space distinction with which to argue for or against a
perceptual grounding for demonstratives. Next we consider the data from the sister (non-linguistic)
spatial memory experiments showing that memory for object location is affected by multiple con-
straints paralleling the language data.
10.2. Perception and memory for object location
Memory for object location is taken to involve memory for the location in which an object is placed,
memory for the object, and a binding between object location and object (Postma & De Haan, 1996). In
contrast to the view that object location is primary (Jiang et al., 2000), our results show systematic
distance migrations as a function of object ownership, visibility, and familiarity.
The inﬂuence of ownership on memory for object location builds on earlier studies showing en-
hanced memory for objects owned than for those not owned (Cunningham et al., 2008; Shi et al.,
2011). However, in contrast to previous ﬁndings our experiments reveal more accurate memory for
object location (rather than for object identity) when the participant owns that object than when
the object is owned by someone else (i.e. objects misremembered as being further away than they
actually were).
Familiarity exhibits a similar inﬂuence to ownership on memory for object location. Objects that
are less familiar to participants are remembered as being further away than where they actually were.
In both the case of ownership and familiarity, one might argue that perception of distance is partly
determined by a concept of mental accessibility or mental connection to objects, where objects that
are effortful to process or objects with reduced desirability through being owned by another (Beggan,
1992) are perceived as being further away. Such a perspective is consistent with results from recent
work on distance perception arguing that perception of the physical environment is not easily disen-
tangled from the desires and experiences of the perceiver (Balcetis & Dunning, 2010; Profﬁtt, 2006).
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ipants throw a beanbag to an object as a measure of perceived distance to it, ﬁnding that participants
underthrew the bean bag for a desirable object (a $25 gift card) and slightly overthrew it when it had a
$0 value.
On closer inspection the results from the ownership study are not easily accounted for in terms of
some mental concept of accessibility, desirability, or effort – nor in terms of physical accessibility. In
Experiment 4 we manipulated both accessibility to an object (blocking access to it through the object
being covered or uncovered) and visibility (using a metal cover versus a glass cover). If accessibility to
the object is important, we would have expected that memory for object location would differ be-
tween the uncovered condition and the two covered conditions. In contrast, the results showed clear
differences between the metal cover condition where the object was not visible (following covering)
and both the covered visible and uncovered (visible) conditions. This suggests that visibility, not
accessibility, is the origin of the differences. So how can this result be accommodated within a model
of object location memory?
Taken together, the results can be most parsimoniously explained through a model where the dis-
tance an object is expected to be located is combined with the actual distance an object is located
(with an associated estimation error) in memory, as follows:MD ¼ f ðDa;Dexp;DerrÞ
where M = signed memory error, D = distance, a = actual, exp = expected and err = estimation error.
For example, objects that are owned are expected to be nearer us than objects that are owned by
someone else (and are placed nearer when we move them; Constable et al., 2011). Taking Dexp as the
distance an object would usually be placed from a person, the MD value is lower for the owned object
than for the unowned object. (Note that MD for the owned object is still an overestimate, which is
likely to be a reﬂection of general estimation error, Derr.)
The familiarity results and the visibility results can be treated in the same manner. Objects that are
not visible are expected to be on average much further away than objects that are visible. And it is also
reasonable to assume that Dexp for objects that are unfamiliar would be much larger than Dexp for
familiar objects. The data support this model (see Fig. 3), but further research will be required to pop-
ulate the expected distance values and to assess their inﬂuence (within participants) on distance
memory (MD). .
Such a model can easily be accommodated within a memory framework. But one can also speculate
regarding whether the expected location inﬂuence occurs early on in encoding of object location (i.e.
during perception), or later in recall. Several studies examining perception of distance show similar
results across methods varying in their susceptibility to postperceptual processes (see Balcetis & Dun-
ning, 2010, for discussion), suggesting that the effects we have found may be perceptual rather than
post-perceptual. Nevertheless, one possible way of delineating between the effects we have found for
object location memory as encoding or retrieval effects is to vary the time interval between encoding
and retrieval. One might expect an increasing inﬂuence of expected location the greater the time inter-
val between encoding and retrieval if primarily postperceptual processes drive effects. This is worth
testing in future studies.
The type of model we advocate here is consistent with the account of perception offered by Bar
(2009), who claims that perception involves both top down prediction and bottom up sensory pro-
cessing. Bar has argued persuasively that perception of the environment relies on memory as much
as it does on incoming information, blurring the boundary between perception and cognition. Our data
suggest that top-down expectations about objects do drive understanding of (and memory for) loca-
tional distance, consistent with prediction-driven accounts of perceptual understanding.
10.3. Demonstratives and perception in context
Across the experiments the manipulations of ownership, visibility, familiarity and distance have
been found to affect both demonstrative choice and memory for object location. But what is the map-
ping between these results, and how do they inform understanding of demonstrative systems and per-
ception of object location?
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tial representation as a motivation for the design of Experiment 7. One of these possibilities – that lan-
guage affects non-linguistic memory for object location – was explicitly tested with the introduction
of a verbal interference condition in Experiment 7. The results showed that object familiarity effects
do not diminish under conditions of articulatory suppression, thereby discounting the hypothesis, at
least with respect to demonstratives, that the distinctions a language makes are used as a tool during
the task to aid memory performance (Frank et al., 2008; Li et al., 2011).
This leaves us with two possible relationships between demonstratives and memory for object
location. One position is that the use of language is parasitic on non-linguistic representations of space
(Barsalou, 2008; Clark, 1973; Jackendoff, 1983; Landau & Jackendoff, 1993; Talmy, 1983). The other is
that both the language of space and memory for object location are both subject to the same under-
lying constraints (Crawford et al., 2000).
In order to disentangle these two views, it is important to examine the patterning of results across
the demonstratives and memory tasks. First, aside from one interaction between familiarity and dis-
tance that was not replicated in Experiment 7, the results of the demonstrative experiments and the
memory experiments were strikingly similar. Distance from the participant impacts upon demonstra-
tive choice and memory for object location the most (see Tables 1 and 2), and the effects of ownership,
visibility and familiarity closely mirror each other. But the most direct relationship between them was
established in Experiment 7 with a correlation between demonstrative use and memory for object
location; participants showing the biggest inﬂuence of familiarity on demonstrative choice also show
the biggest inﬂuence of familiarity on memory for object location. This pattern of results, in our view,
strongly supports a model where the language of space is parasitic on (non-linguistic) vision and ac-
tion representations. The alternative model proposed by Crawford et al. (2000) was motivated by
divergence in performance on spatial language tasks (prepositions) and memory for position. In our
data we ﬁnd no such divergence, bypassing the need (on grounds of parsimony) for a third underlying
variable to explain the relationship between our measures.
If demonstrative choice is parasitic upon the ﬂexible perception of space, one can argue that the
distinctions languages make in varied demonstrative systems may be a direct result of packaging
available perceptual parameters in ﬂexible ways also. To the peripersonal–extrapersonal space dis-
tinction we have added visibility, ownership and familiarity to the set of perceptual parameters affect-
ing distance perception/memory for distance – but there will be others. In fact, if it is true that
demonstrative distinctions come from perceptual distinctions, then the distinctions languages make
in their demonstrative systems may themselves be informative regarding distinctions that are worth
exploring with respects to perceptual space. For example, person-centred contrasts in demonstrative
systems – my space versus your space – is a possible candidate that may affect basic perception of
distance and memory for distance. In support of this, there is some evidence that people are sensitive
to how another person may interact with an object from their point of view when they share space but
nevertheless have a different perspective on it (Grifﬁths & Tipper, 2009).
The alternative interpretation of our results is that both language to describe space and perception
of space are subject to the types of ‘pragmatic’ contextual constraints that have previously been re-
served to supplement language semantics (see for example Enﬁeld, 2003, for a pragmatic account
of Lao demonstratives). This is certainly an intriguing possibility, but one that would require a radical
shift in how one construes the act of perceiving. For now at least, the idea that demonstrative use in
language is parasitic on non-linguistic representation of space still allows pragmatics in language to go
beyond these constraints while also accounting for greater demonstrative coverage emanating from
perceptual experience.
The idea that perception of distance/memory for distance are affected by a range of parameters
that, in turn, affect how one talks about space, can be considered within the context of learning about
and interacting with objects. Children learn associations between objects, locations, actions, and
words (see Samuelson, Smith, Perry, & Spencer, 2011), and these associations affect how an event is
perceived at any given moment in time. The peripersonal–extrapersonal distinction might emerge,
as has been suggested by Bremner, Holmes, & Spence (2008), through experience of being able to
reach and manipulate objects. Objects that can be reached and manipulated become distinguished
from those that cannot be reached and manipulated. In a similar vein, objects that are owned are more
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likely to be nearer the viewer than objects that are not visible. Taken together, these learned associ-
ated might then lead to predictions about where an object is, conjoining the bottom up information
about where the object actually is in the perception of distance (consonant with Bar, 2009).
Such a model might also give clues to patterning of demonstrative systems across languages. From
a developmental perspective, the distinction between peripersonal and extrapersonal space emerges
within the second 6 months of life. Experientially, this early distinction between contacting and not
contacting an object can be regarded as foundational. Concepts, such as ownership, emerge much la-
ter, long after the action system is wired up (Friedman & Neary, 2008). On that basis, one might spec-
ulate that the peripersonal/extrapersonal distinction is a better candidate to provide a basic
distinction for the world’s demonstrative systems than ownership. This idea that the most basic vision
and action processes are likely to be represented the most in spatial language across languages has a
long history (see Clark, 1973), but such an approach needs to be tempered with the observation that
language universals are hard to pin down (see Evans & Levinson, 2009).
While the present work supports a strong link between spatial demonstratives and perceptual
space, it is important to remember that demonstratives across languages are used in a wide variety
of ways, and in many non-spatial contexts. For example, demonstratives are often used contrastively
(‘this planet and that planet’), temporally (‘this time and that time’), as well as serving many discourse
(endophoric) functions (see Diessel, 1999; Piwek et al., 2008, for discussion). It is these other uses that
have been taken as one of the main challenges to the idea that demonstratives are grounded in the
vision and action systems (Kemmerer, 1999; Kemmerer, 2006). The inherent ﬂexibility in both the
perception of distance and the choice of language to describe object location provide a natural means
from which other ﬂexible functions of demonstratives may well originate.11. Conclusions
There is a striking correspondence between spatial demonstrative choice to describe object loca-
tion and (non-linguistic) memory for object location. Spatial demonstrative choice in English is much
more similar to demonstrative contrasts in other languages than a simple binary proximal–distal con-
trast in English would suggest. The results reinforce the importance of the mapping between periper-
sonal and extrapersonal space and demonstrative choice – but with an enriched conceptualization of
what memory for object location entails. Both language to talk about space and non-linguistic concep-
tualisation of space are inﬂuenced by a common set of high-level variables.
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List of objects used in Experiments.
Experiments 1 and 2 (ownership): 50p, £1, £2 coins.
Experiments 3 and 4 (visibility): red square, red triangle; blue semicircle, blue diamond, yellow
heart.
Experiments 5 and 6 (familiarity): FAMILIAR OBJECTS – yellow heart, orange square, blue circle, red
triangle. UNFAMILIAR OBJECTS – cerulean ranunculoid, viridian nonagon, chartreuse nephroid, aure-
olin undecagon.
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